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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is based upon Rule 3 of the URCP and is before the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA §78-2(a)-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issues presented for appeal are: 
1. Is the plaintiff/appellant entitled to receive a judgement 
against the defendant/appellee for the sum of $28,800.00 as child 
support arrearages based on the fact that the defendant/appellee 
has never paid child support. In conjunction with this particular 
item it must be further determined by the court whether or not the 
defendant/appellee is entitled to claim payments made by the Social 
Security Administration to the plaintiff/appellant as his payments 
of child support. 
The standard for review in this particular area is the 
correction of error standard. Bailey v. Call, 767 P. 2d 138 
(Ut.Ct.Epp. 1989) cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (Ut. 1989). 
2. What offset is the plaintiff/appellant entitled to receive 
based upon the defendant/appellee's failure to pay the court 
ordered support against the residence and additionally is the 
defendant/appellee allowed to claim the payments made in excess of 
the court ordered child support through the Social Security 
Administration for his benefit. 
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The standard for review in this particular area is the 
correction of error standard. Bailey v. Call, 767 P. 2d 138 
(Ut.Ct.Epp. 1989) cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (Ut. 1989). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
ABOUT THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
UCA § 78-45-3. 
Every father shall support his child;... 
Rule 6-404 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be 
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the 
original divorce action. Service of the petition and 
summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance 
with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. No request for a modification of an 
existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to 
show cause. 
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply 
within twenty days after service of the petition. Either 
party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be 
referred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to 
trial, or in those districts where there is not a 
domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial 
calendar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on 
a law and motion or order to show cause calendar without 
the consent of the commissioner or the district judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding and 
Disposition in a Lower Court* 
The defendant/appellee brought an Order to Show Cause seeking 
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his one-half (1/2) share of the equity of the marital residence. 
R-79. The plaintiff/appellant responded with a Counter Order to 
Show Cause seeking contempt against the defendant/appellee for his 
failure to pay child support, judgement for support arrearages, 
offset for any claims against the marital residence and attorneys 
fees. R-87. The matter was originally heard by Judith S. H. 
Atherton, Domestics Relations Commissioner on September 7, 1994. 
Pursuant to Minute Entry the Commissioner made her ruling on 
September 14, 1994. R-93. An objection was made to the 
Commissioner7s recommendation by the plaintiff/appellant. R-100. 
Oral argument was presented to the Honorable Frank G. Noel on March 
31, 1995 (R-117) with his ruling being made by Minute Entry on 
April 6, 1995. R-118-119. The judgement as entered by the court on 
April 26, 1995 disallowed the plaintiff/appellants claim of 
support arrearages against the defendant/appellee of $28,800.00 and 
granted to the defendant/appellee a judgement in the sum of 
$2,812.00 pursuant to an offset of $988.00 from the $3,800.00 
claimed by the defendant/appellee. 
B. Statement of facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review 
The parties were divorced on January 13, 1983. R-19-21. On 
March 4, 1995 the defendant/appellee's equity in the home was 
reduced to the amount of $3,800.00. R-66-67. 
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The defendant/appellee brought his Order to Show Cause seeking 
payment of $3,800.00 for his claim on the residence. R-79-81. The 
defendant/appellee has never paid child support. The 
defendant/appellee became disabled and made application for 
benefits sometime after November 1987 and commencing approximately 
November 198 7 the plaintiff/appellant began receiving SSI benefits 
on behalf of the parties7 minor children. From the time period of 
March 1985 through June 1986 the amount of the child support 
arrearages due by the defendant/appellee to the 
plaintiff/appellant, calculated at $300.00 per month, would have 
been $4,800.00. The amount of child support arrearages due from 
the defendant/appellee to the plaintiff/appellant on the 
commencement of the SSI benefit would have been the sum of 
$9,600.00 (Mar. 1985 to Nov. 1987) 
There was no evidence that the payments as made herein from 
the SSI were due to the earnings of the defendant/appellee but were 
based solely on a disability benefit. The amount as paid to the 
plaintiff/appellant through SSI from November 1987 to July 1994 was 
the sum of $32,612.00. The monthly amount as paid to the 
plaintiff/appellant from the SSI is greater than the $300.00 
monthly obligation of child support of the defendant/appellee. 
The trial court denied the claim of support arrearages as 
sought by the plaintiff/appellant against the defendant/appellee of 
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$28,800.00. The trial court added all the monies which should have 
been paid by the defendant/appellee from the time period of March 
1985 through July 1994 and subtracted from that amount the amount 
of SSI payments which had been made through July 1994 of $32,612.00 
which left an arrearage of $988.00. This $988.00 was offset 
against the marital residence obligation owed by the 
plaintiff/appellant to the defendant/appellee of $3,800.00 leaving 
a judgement against the plaintiff/appellant and in favor of the 
defendant/appellee in the sum of $2,812.00. R-118-119. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Without the necessity of ever having to file a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce, the trial court entered an Order 
which totally modified the child support obligation of the 
defendant/appellee to the plaintiff/appellant. The trial court 
misapplied the SSI benefits which have been paid to the parties' 
minor children to the credit of the defendant/appellee. The 
defendant/appellee has not paid his support obligations and but for 
the SSI benefits being paid, the plaintiff/appellant would never 
have received any support for and on behalf of the parties' minor 
children. The application of credits and offsets which the trial 
court gave to the plaintiff/appellant were inappropriate. The 
$3,800.00 owing by the plaintiff/appellant to the 
defendant/appellee against the marital residence should have been 
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totally "wiped out" based upon the support offset obligation owed 
by the defendant/appellee to the plaintiff/appellant which was in 
the amount of $4,800.00 owing to June 1986. 
The plaintiff/appellant should have been awarded a judgement 
in the sum of $28,800.00 as the amount owing by the 
defendant/appellee for the child support obligation from July 1986 
to July 1994 but in any event not less than $5,100.00 which would 
have been the amount of the support obligation owing from July 1986 
to November 1987 when the SSI benefit commenced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE 
APPELLEE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$28,800.00 
The defendant/appellee has not paid child support. The 
defendant/appellee's lien on the marital residence was reduced to 
the sum of $3,800.00 based upon his failure to pay child support. 
After the $3,800.00 had been determined from the hearing on March 
4, 1985, the defendant/appellee again failed and refused to pay 
child support. The defendant/appellee has ignored his statutory 
duty to support his children as required by UCA §78-45-3. 
The defendant/appellee has not since March 1985 ever moved the 
court to modify the Decree of Divorce. The only act that have been 
taken by the defendant/appellee since March 1985 was the filing of 
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his Order to Show Cause in order to obtain his claimed share 
against the marital residence. 
The plaintiff/appellant has acknowledges receipt of the SSI 
benefit which amounts would have been greater, on a monthly basis, 
than the defendant/appellee's child support obligation. These 
benefits did not commence until November 1987 and have continued 
through this time. 
The trial court in its analysis, did not give to the 
plaintiff/appellant a judgement against the defendant/appellee for 
the $28,800.00 arrearages. This amount is based on an eight (8) 
year period as provided pursuant to UCA §78-12-22, of no payments 
being made personally by defendant/appellee. The trial court in 
effect modified the Decree of Divorce based upon the SSI benefits 
which the plaintiff/appellant has been receiving and used those as 
"defendant's child support". If these monies had been paid through 
the SSI based upon defendant/appellee's earnings there may have 
been a reasonable and rational basis to argue this theory and one 
which would have been allowed statutorily pursuant to UCA §78-45-
7.5(8)(b). (Note: §78-45-7.5(8)(b) became effective on April 24, 
1989.) However, there was no showing that these monies were ever 
based upon the defendant/appellee's earnings but were in fact based 
upon his disability. In any event no action has ever been taken by 
the defendant/appellee to come forward and ask the court to modify 
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the Decree as is required pursuant to Rule 6-404 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. The court in this case has proceeded to 
modify the Decree on an Order to Show Cause calendar without the 
necessity of filing a formal Petition for Modification. This court 
has held in Bailey v. Adams. 798 P.2d 1142 (Ut. App. 1990) and 
Grover v. Grover. 839 P.2d 871 (Ut. App. 1992) that a Decree may 
not be modified except through the service of the Summons and 
filing of a Petition for Modification. This has not been 
accomplished by the defendant/appellee in this case. It is 
inappropriate for the court to modify the Decree without there 
existing a Petition for Modification with the appropriate service 
of a Summons. Additionally, the benefit as provided pursuant to 
UCA §78-45-7.5(8)(b) can not be sought absent a request through a 
Petition for Modification. See Bailey v. Adams. 798 P.2d 1142 (Ut. 
App. 1990) and Grover v. Grover. 839 P.2d 871 (Ut. App. 1992) where 
this court held that there is no retroactive application of the 
child support guidelines. 
If this court allows the logic of the trial court to be used 
in this matter of modifying the Decree by Order to Show Cause, then 
the next issue for this court to determine is when does the 
modification occur. If the modification occurs on the serving of 
the Order to Show Cause then the judgement date to which the 
plaintiff/appellant would be entitled to judgement against the 
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defendant/appellee for child support arrearages would be as of July 
1994 using June 1986 as the commencing date for calculation 
purposes. If the modification date is seen as the date when the 
benefits commenced to being paid to the plaintiff/appellant then 
the judgement date would be November 1987 with June 1986 the 
commencing date for calculation purposes. The next issue which the 
court would thereafter need to determine would be how the SSI 
benefits would apply to the defendant/appellee's child support 
obligation. The trial court in its reasoning determined a full 
dollar amount that had been paid to the plaintiff/appellant between 
the time periods of November 1987 to July 1994 by SSI in making its 
award. If this logic is followed then it would mean that 
eventually the plaintiff/appellant would have to repay monies to 
the defendant/appellee because there would eventually be a greater 
amount paid by the SSI than what would exist under the 
defendant/appellee's child support obligation. It can not be 
imagined that this would be what this court would adopt or find as 
being the appropriate manner in which to handle this situation. If 
the support obligation is seen as a month to month payment rather 
than a dollar against a dollar payment then the 
defendant/appellee's obligations would have been paid between 
November 1987 to July 1994 with the resulting arrearages owing by 
the defendant/appellee to the plaintiff/appellant of $5,100.00 
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which would be calculated at $300.00 per month owing from July 1986 
to November 1987. If no month to month or dollar for dollar credit 
is given to the defendant/appellee for this based on the fact that 
he has not petitioned the court to modify his support obligations 
and the support obligation has continued then the amount that would 
be owed by the defendant/appellee to the plaintiff /appellant would 
be the sum $28,800 to July 1994. 
It would be better law to require that the defendant/appellee 
take an affirmative step in having his support obligation modified. 
This is required by both Bailey and Graver, supra. This has never 
been done by the defendant/appellee. This action is also required 
purusant to Rule 6-404 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Because of the defendant/appellee's failure to properly request 
modification of his support obligation and to have the same 
addressed so that the SSI benefit could be claimed as his support 
obligation the trial court should not have used the SSI payments 
for his support obligation and no relief should be given to the 
defendant/appellee. The trial court "assumed" a substancial change 
in circumstances had occured and thereafter retroactively entered 
the same again, this type of conduct is prohibited by both Bailev 
and Grover, supra. This court should award to the 
plaintiff/appellant judgement against the defendant/appellee for 
the sum of $28,800.00 which would be the support obligation owing 
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between July 1986 through June 1994. In the alternative, this 
court should at a minimum award to the plaintiff/appellant 
$5,100.00 as a judgement against the defendant/appellee over the 
time period of July 1986 through to November 1987 when the SSI 
benefit commenced. The defendant/appellee should not be given a 
credit of the increased amounts as paid by the SSI benefit for his 
behalf. Eventually it would require repayment by the 
plaintiff/appellant. 
The defendant/appellee has a continuing obligation to support 
his children. UCA §78-45-3. The defendant/appellee has not 
supported his children but has allowed the government and citizens 
of the United States to support his children. The 
defendant/appellee has done nothing appropriately as required by 
statute or equity to show that he deserves credit for the payments 
as made by and through SSI. The defendant/appellee should not have 
been given relief as granted by the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY CALCULATED THE OFFSET ON 
THE REAL PROPERTY AND THEREAFTER INAPPROPRIATELY GAVE TO 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE A JUDGEMENT AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT • 
The trial court in its application of offset appropriately 
followed the case Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Ut. 1985) in 
granting an offset, however the manner of the calculation by the 
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trial court is inappropriate. The trial court calculated a dollar 
amount of the obligation which would have been owing from March 
1985 through July 1994 and thereafter determined how much had been 
paid through the SSI benefit and subtracted that amount as a credit 
against the defendant/appellee's obligation and awarded only 
$988.00 as an offset from the monies owed by the 
plaintiff/appellant to the defendant/appellee on the marital 
residence. This is a misapplication of the credit of the SSI 
benefits and should not have been done by the trial court in this 
fashion. No monies should have been required to be paid by the 
plaintiff/appellant to the defendant/appellee based on the fact 
that the appropriate amount of offset would have been the sum of 
$4,800.00 which would have been calculated at the rate of $300.00 
per month from March 1985 through June 1986. The eight (8) year 
statute of limitations (UCA §78-12-22) prohibits the 
plaintiff/appellant from obtaining the other $1,000.00 from the 
defendant/appellee but pursuant to Jacobsen the entire $4,800.00 
would be offset against any claim of the defendant/appellee against 
the plaintiff/appellant. 
If the logic of the trial court is applied it is again seen 
that eventually the plaintiff/appellant would owe more monies to 
the defendant/appellee because of the excess amount paid by SSI 
over and above the defendant/appellee's child support obligation. 
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This logic is unreasonable. The plaintiff/appellant should not 
have been required to pay any sums against the marital residence 
based on defendant/appellee's failure to ever pay his child support 
obligation based on the accumulated arrearages which would have 
been owed through June 1986. The application of the SSI benefits 
was wrongfully applied by the trial court. The defendant/appellee 
should not receive a credit for the excess funds paid by SSI as was 
allowed by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The awards of the trial court should be set aside and 
reversed. No judgement should be awarded to the defendant/appellee 
against the plaintiff/appellant for the $2,812.00 as monies owing 
on the marital residence. These sums were totally satisfied based 
upon the defendant/appellee's failure to pay the child support 
obligation and the appropriate offset which should have been made 
by the trial court. 
The plaintiff/appellant should have been awarded judgement 
against the defendant/appellee the sum of $28,800.00 for the amount 
of child support which would have been due and owing from July 1, 
1986 through June 1994 or in the alternative at least the amount of 
$5,100.00 which would have been for the time periods between July 
1, 1986 through November 1987. The SSI benefits as paid should not 
have been credited against defendant/appellee's obligations as was 
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CONCLUSION 
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against the plaintiff/appellant for the $2,812.00 as monies owing 
on the marital residence. These sums were totally satisfied based 
upon the defendant/appellee's failure to pay the child support 
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by the trial court. 
The plaintiff/appellant should have been awarded judgement 
against the defendant/appellee the sum of $28,800.00 for the amount 
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$5,100.00 which would have been for the time periods between July 
1, 1986 through November 1987. The SSI benefits as paid should not 
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have been credited against defendant/appellee's obligations as was 
done by the trial court. 
Additionally, the plaintiff/appellant should be awarded her 
costs and attorneys fees in this matter as was sought pursuant to 
her Counter-Order to Show Cause. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2, d#^pt August, ^ 1^5. 
IDY Si EHDLOW 
AttorneyHEor Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
00003254.95 18 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Tamara Lee Coulon, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, 
: Civil No. 824901630 DA 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
Mark Fletcher Coulon, : 
Defendant. : 
The court has reviewed the plaintiffs Objection to the Recommendation of the 
Commissioner, has heard oral argument thereon and having taken the matter under advisement 
now rules as follows: 
This ruling applies only to the Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation which 
addresses the period of time up to July, 1994. The court makes no ruling with regard to 
amounts owed by either party, if any, since July, 1994. 
It appears from a review of the file that the defendant's claim on the residence was 
reduced to the amount of $3,800.00 in March of 1985 to compensate for back due child support 
arrearages. 
The amount of child support due therefore, from March of 1985 through June of 1986, 
at $300.00 per month, would be $4,800.00. The amount due from July, 1986 to July, 1994 
would be $28,800.00 for a total child support arrearage of $33,600.00. 
000118 
COULON V. COULON PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
Defendant claims that the $4,800.00 amount was time barred. The court is of the opinion 
however, that under the authority of Jacobsonv. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Ut. 1985) that amount 
may be used as an offset by the plaintiff for any amounts due and owing to the defendant. If 
that principle applies in a promissory note context as in the Jacobson v. Bunker case then it 
surely would apply in the context of a child support arrearage case where the policy 
considerations for an offset are even greater. Accordingly, the amount due and owing by 
defendant from the period of time from March, 1985 to July, 1994 is $33,600.00. 
The court is of the opinion that defendant should receive credit for SSI payments made 
to the children through July, 1994 of $32,612.00. That leaves an arrearage of $988.00 which 
may be used as an offset by the plaintiff against the amount due and owing and the court will 
therefore award the defendant a judgment of $3,800.00 less the $988.00 offset for total judgment 
of $2,812.00. The court will affirm the Commissioner's recommendations in every other 
respect. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order and judgment. 
Dated this fj ^day of April, 1995. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
2 copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, by placing the same 
in the United States Mail, in a postage pre-paid sealed envelope, 
this ££- day of August, 1995 to the following: 
JAMES C. HASKINS 
5085 SOUTH STATE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-4840 
i I*e^ lie Frederick 
Secretary 
00003254.95 19 
